German-Turkish tensions in a collapsing Jamaica coalition

Federal chairman of The Greens, Cem Oezdemir in conversation with chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) during failing exploratory talks between the CDU, CSU, FDP and Green Party in Berlin, Germany, 10 November 2017. Gregor Fischer/Press Association. All rights reserved.After the September 2017 federal elections in
Germany, the conservative Union parties, CDU/CSU, the liberal FDP party and the
Green party set out to form the so-called Jamaica coalition government, which
have failed after the liberal party withdrawal in mid-November and may lead to
a minority coalition government (CDU/CSU and Green party). Ever since the 2002
federal election campaign, when the then German chancellor Gerhard Schröder was
reelected, mainly because of his game-changing refusal to support the US’s Iraq
invasion, contention over foreign policy has been absent from Berlin’s
political competition. Hence, the Bundestag has predominantly seen largely
unified positions, also with regard to Ankara. The political situation in
Turkey and the combination of an electorally soaring populist radical-right
challenger party and a deliberately oppositional Social Democratic party prophesy
stormy times ahead for German-Turkish relations.

In the last decade or so, German foreign policy has been largely
characterized by a broadly unified stance towards Turkey. Berlin perceived the
first ten years of AKP rule as moderately positive. On the EU level, EU
accession negotiations with Turkey commenced in 2005 and Germany, holding vast
leverage in EU politics, proved to be far from vetoing the opening of accession
talks. However, the authoritarian suppression of the 2013 Gezi protests in
Istanbul darkened Germany’s view of Turkey; and its image of the then prime
minister and current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was accordingly impaired.

From 2013 onwards, German politics has increasingly presented a united,
critical shoulder-to-shoulder stance against the Turkish government concerning
the unhappy state of democracy in Turkey. However, we now witness a significant
deepening of EU-Turkey trade relations and political collaboration (EU-Turkey
migration deal) in the framework of a recent and most salient political issue,
namely migration and integration; while on the other hand, transnational
blaming – to name some: mutual ‘Nazi’ accusations, the blocking of public
appearances of AKP MPs in western European countries, the Armenian Genocide
resolution of the German Bundestag,
the Jan Böhmermann case – between Berlin and Ankara has flourished ever since
the EU-Turkey migration deal was agreed in March 2016.

As of then, Turkey was expecting an imminent happy ending in terms of an
EU visa-waiver deal for Turkish citizens. However, the EU wanted Turkey first to
stick to the remaining criteria, one of which includes reforming Turkey’s
highly contested anti-terror laws, which the AKP has abstained from
liberalising. Apart from that, in light of the rise of a populist radical-right
party in Germany and the (political) detention of German citizens in Turkey, the
visa-waiver deal gathered huge symbolic weight in German domestic as well as
foreign policy. Being left unresolved, this issue sparked many other political
conflicts between Berlin and Ankara.

On the Turkish side, pro-European stances are based on a prolonged
history across the Turkish political spectrum. Indeed, the Turkish narrative of
marking a historical ‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia implies the notion of
Turkey belonging, politically and culturally, to Europe. Especially, opposition
parties have been keen to mobilise the electorate through a sound
anti-governmental pro-Europe claim, habitually claiming that the government
party would thwart Turkey’s relations with Europe or the West. Substantial pro-European
(and pro-German especially) sentiments have been predominant in the past 50+
years within Turkish society.

The perceptions of Germany (also the EU), however, have changed rapidly in
recent years. Before that, the historical German ally in the heart of Europe was
esteemed the ‘old friend’ who will lobby within the EU in favour of Turkey’s EU
accession. This image of Germany shifted drastically after vocal critics of Erdoğan
arose. Nowadays, German chancellor Merkel is widely portrayed as a threat to
Turkey and an insincere (western) foreign-power leader who claims to give democracy
lectures but is herself resorting to anti-democratic political practices
against Turkish politicians (e.g. the prohibition of election rallies in
Germany), which, according to Erdoğan, stem from Germany’s bitter racist
Holocaust past.

The Sèvres Syndrome

Ever since the AKP gained political power in Ankara, party leaders have injected
a single dominant narrative into the Turkish public sphere, i.e. the Turkish
people’s glorious resurrection story. One fundamental characteristic of
political narratives is that they paint heartwarming romantic imagery of both
the past and the future. Under AKP rule, the Turkish nation has been narrated
as marching towards a bright and prosperous future; and, in fact, economically,
Turkey has been prospering for some time. On the cultural level, neo-Ottomanism
came into romantic bloom boosted by AKP leaders who interlaced neo-Ottomanism
with Turkey’s most influential (foreign) policy driver: the Sèvres Syndrome. The
latter runs parallel with and in contradistinction to substantial pro-European
(and pro-German) stances in Turkey. It displays a popular belief in Turkish
political culture that (western) foreign powers permanently forge sinister
plans to undermine the rise of the Turkish nation. In such a political context,
strong (not to say authoritarian) foreign-policy charges against western
authorities engender strong emotional attachments to the nation among (reluctant
and radical) nationalistic voters.

In fact, the Turkish government has been in constant need of domestic
voter mobilization as, in recent years, one election after another has followed
more referendums. In light of the Sèvres Syndrome, Turkish politics has always
been tempted to diffuse conspiracies about domestic political opponents’
collaboration with (western) foreign powers that together aim to sell out the
Turkish nation. After the step-by-step undermining of democratic checks and
balances, and the detention of influential oppositional leaders, the AKP
leaders have maintained a tight grip on defining internal and external threats
to the Turkish nation.

They have made this target move in various directions in recent decades,
while some aspects intersected: such as, the notion of some (former or current) elites,
i.e. the Turkish military (Ergenekon case), the Kemalist elite and the Gülenist
movement (especially in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt). Holding an absolute
monopoly on the definitions of the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ guys, and the bad guys’
(foreign) accomplices, AKP rule aggravates Berlin’s desire to reach out to
Turkey and domestic German-Turks. Yet, any support for democrats in Turkey can
be narrated as “western foreign power infiltration through Turkish
collaborators”.

Logical reasoning suggests a preference for a sober over an optimistic
approach to German-Turkish relations, since no less than three elections await
the Turks in 2019. Among others (the federal and local elections), a possible
game-changing presidency of no less than 15 years will be at stake.

How can Germany revise its foreign policy in relation to Turkey in such
a contested and polarised political situation which, depending on whether you
support or criticize the AKP leaders, may be depicted as either for or against
the Turkish people? In a broader sense, in what direction are these trends in
the national political context and mutual perception leading German-Turkish
relations?

Cem Özdemir

AKP politician Mustafa Yeneroğlu recently got
to the heart of what many experts believe: if a possible minority coalition government
includes the Green party co-leader Cem Özdemir becoming the German foreign
minister, then hard times for German-Turkish relations lie ahead.

In the past, Cem Özdemir has repeatedly come
forward as a vocal critic of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in several contexts. In 2016,
he played a key role when the German Bundestag voted on the Armenian Genocide
resolution. Referring to those German-Turkish MPs in the Bundestag who voted in
favour of recognition of the Armenian Genocide (with an unambiguous and
specific focus on Cem Özdemir), Erdoğan called their Turkishness into question,
charged them with possessing ‘defective blood’ (‘kanı bozuk’) and accused them of
being no less than Germany-based extensions of domestic terror organisations.

If Germany chooses Cem Özdemir as its foreign
minister, Turkey will frame that as a direct political affront. In Turkey’s
view, such a move by Germany would mark an intentionally aggressive step
against the Turkish people which fits the overall assumption, actively boosted
by AKP leaders in the recent years, that the West is forging plans to impede
the Turkish nation’s rise.

The second perception is interrelated with this
first aspect: compartmentalising domestic politics is futile when both
countries are so interwoven. Maintaining firm transnational trade or economic
relations between Germany and Turkey is but one part of the multifaceted story.
A more decisive part concerns the transnational political identities that
emerged in the post-guestworker-treaty era. Hence, a major point is that
Germany (or the EU) does not simply play out its soft power role vis-à-vis
Turkey by requiring the latter to meet the Copenhagen criteria as it would do with
regard to other EU member candidates. Rather both Germany and Turkey must
necessarily take into account the fact that some three million Europe-based
(1.8 million Germany-based) Turkish citizens are eligible to vote in Turkish
elections – that is roughly 5 per cent of the general vote.

Some argue that there is a plausible rationale
for Turks in Europe to support AKP rule: for a long time, they faced
discrimination in western Europe, which is why Erdoğan’s glorious resurrection
story of Turkey rising up against ‘the West’ keenly provokes their
ethnic-cultural pride on an emotional level. True, this might apply to many.
Yet, the other ‘48 per cent’ (a prominent political number in recent referenda)
bonds well emotionally with oppositional Turkish groups in Europe (or Germany)
since, in their view, Turkey is actually (and unfortunately) facing severe
anti-democratic and cultural doom.

In any case, 2016 was evidence of the fact that
Turkish immigrants in western Europe, especially in Germany, challenge obsolete
clear-cut national distinctions between domestic and foreign policy. These
people transnationally bond with the politics of their country of origin as
well as their country of residence – either in favour of or against the leading
Turkish government.

Ultimately, Mustafa Yeneroğlu is right in assuming German-Turkish
relations will suffer if Cem Özdemir leads the German foreign ministry, since
he would resonate in Turkish domestic politics as he has done in the past. However,
Yeneroğlu deceives himself in believing that Turkey might be capable of protecting
domestic policy from the involvement of Turks living abroad. Cem Özdemir, like many
others, lives abroad yet has political rights in Turkey.

Germany and Turkey have to come to terms with these hard transnational
facts; for manifold reasons, political rights transcend nation-state boundaries
in many directions and, as part of ‘two peoples’ (Germany and Turkey),
individuals and public actors own and make use of these political rights, such
as participating in political debates and elections in both countries that they
legally, politically and culturally belong to.

Pandora’s box

Thirdly, recent changes in the German political system provide fertile
ground for heated German-Turkish political conflicts. In Turkey, AKP voters have
been broadly mobilised by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strong (masculine) leader
image along with his radical nationalistic narrative, i.e. he has attracted
voters by banging on the table in the name of the Turkish people against the
West (and internal ‘others’). Basically, the combination of these elements seems
likely to exacerbate rather than allay Turkish foreign policy relating to the
EU.

However, while the Turkish part of the story has remained constant over
the past ten years, momentous changes have occurred recently in the German
political system. On the one hand, the German far right has positioned itself
anew in the form of a populist radical-right party (AfD) represented in the
German Bundestag, while on the other hand, the Social Democrats (SPD) promptly
opted out of building the next Grand Coalition after having achieved a
miserable vote share.

Both the SPD and the AfD will scratch the surface of Berlin’s
shoulder-to-shoulder stance vis-à-vis Ankara. During the electoral campaign,
SPD party chairman Schulz clearly pronounced that Germany has to (and will)
pursue a hawkish policy as regards Turkish President Erdoğan. At present, it seems
very likely that the Social Democrats, if leading the opposition, will question
any past and future deals with Turkey under AKP rule, and they will thus induce
heated political contention over German and EU foreign policy related to
Turkey. Moreover, the SPD might vocally align with democrats in Turkey against
Turkish President Erdoğan, which runs strongly counter to the grain of the
latters’ expectations from Berlin.

It seems highly possible that both phenomena will pose a litmus test for
the minority coalition government, which is, on the one hand, dependent on
trade arrangements and the migration deal with Turkey, while on the other hand,
especially the Green party will push for sanctioning Turkey’s anti-democratic
progress.

And the German political system’s new dissenter, the AfD party, is set
to cater to ultra-conservative, reluctant radical-right and far-right voters on
this political issue, as well. That is, AfD leaders will make strident calls
for cutting all German ties to Turkey based on cultural justifications that
display flourishing and well-established anti-Muslim discourses circulating within
western Europe’s far right, i.e. alleged claims that Islam is incompatible with
(western) democracy or that Turkey is a supporter of the IS cultural war
against the Judeo-Christian West.

To complicate things, we can be sure that Turkish President Erdoğan will
feel himself invited to join heated German foreign policy debates whenever
Turkey is portrayed as anti-democratic since, in his view, democracy in Turkey
came into force anew with the AKP party because his, and only his, party fully
represents ‘the Turkish people’.

Vicious circles

How will Merkel navigate a heated foreign policy related to Turkey, notwithstanding
noisy dissent that stems from within the minority coalition (CSU and Green
party), the leading opposition SPD party, Germany’s new dissenter AfD party,
transnational German-Turkish actors and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan?

Will she be able to maintain her sober differentiated integration
approach towards Turkey, i.e. boosting trade and economic relations while
approaching Turkey more flexibly with regard to the Copenhagen criteria, since
Turkey’s membership hardly seems heading soon for cultural integration into the
EU? So far, this relationship has been regarded as merely a close trade and
political alliance.

Will Merkel’s dialogue and cooperation-oriented approach have to bite
the bullet on such a contested battlefield of German-Turkish affairs or will
she manage to maintain her reconciliation approach? Going beyond what all the combatants
involved believe, German-Turkish (foreign) affairs will, crucially, be
dependent on how German chancellor Angela Merkel succeeds in holding back all the
belligerent men from banging their fists on the table and instead minimizing
the drama which, in recent years, has repeatedly resulted in momentous vicious
circles in the mutual casting of German-Turkish blame.