Long way to Afrin: Turkey’s strategic refugee policy aimed at electoral hegemony and regional political ambitions
Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, FSA, fighters in the Syrian town of Azez near the border with Turkey, Sunday, Jan. 21, 2018. Depo Photos/ Press Association. All rights reserved. On January 20, Turkey began its second
military campaign in northern Syria. The target is Afrin, a Kurdish-majority
canton and stronghold of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military
alliance led by the People’s Protection Unit (YPG).
The Turkish intervention is backed by the Free
Syrian Army (FSA), comprised of several Syrian opposition groups such as the
Islamic Ahrar Al-Sham and the Hamza Brigade. Turkey’s ‘Operation Olive Branch’ objective is aimed at
neutralising the YPG, which Ankara considers a terrorist group and offshoot of
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Kurdish militia involved in an ongoing
conflict with the Turkish state since the eighties.
However, Washington has for long regarded the
YPG as its best ally in the Middle East, thanks to the crucial role played by
the Kurds in the US-led campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria. The most striking difference between the two Turkey-led
interventions lies in the fact that while the former was launched against the
Islamic State, the latter is allegedly being conducted with the support of ISIS fighters, to destroy Syrian Kurdish militias.
This military intervention follows the ‘Operation Euphrates Shield’ launched in Northern
Syria in 2016. The Turkey-led operation was supported by the FSA against ISIS
and the YPG/SDF. The most striking difference between the two Turkey-led
interventions lies in the fact that while the former was launched against the
Islamic State, the latter is allegedly being conducted with the support of ISIS fighters, to destroy Syrian Kurdish militias.
The
international players
This operation launched by Ankara against the
US-backed YPG has exacerbated the tense and delicate relations
between the several international players involved in the Syrian war, and not
only between the two NATO allies.
The military intervention jeopardises
Washington’s diplomatic relations in the region, as well as the fragile agreements between Iran, Turkey and
Russia borne out of the recent Sochi conference hosted by Moscow and strongly
boycotted by the Syrian opposition.
Russia and Iran have been the Syrian regime’s
best allies since the beginning of the conflict. In spite of having maintained positive relations with the Kurds, Russia approved the Afrin operation, which was
key to its launch because it allowed Turkey access to Syrian airspace. Russia’s
support for Ankara’s ambitions risks compromising the Russian-Syrian historical
cooperation which was pivotal to Bashar al-Assad’s enduring power. After the Afrin operation triggered a ‘crisis point’ between Ankara and Washington,
the US Secretary of State Tillerson and Turkey’s Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
attempted to normalise their relations and to search for agreement over Syria.
Shia’ militias backed by the Syrian government
entered Afrin to support the Kurdish resistance
against Ankara’s attacks. Indeed, the SDF might need the Syrian government’s
military support, since Washington is likely to suspend its strategic alliance
with the Kurds. After the Afrin operation triggered a ‘crisis point’ between Ankara and Washington,
the US Secretary of State Tillerson and Turkey’s Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
attempted to normalise their relations and to search for agreement over Syria.
Waging war against the Syrian Kurds with
Syrian Sunni troops is going to further exacerbate sectarian hatred and deepen
the grudges in the region.
The FSA
and Turkish state security
Before investigating the reasons behind
Erdogan’s war on the Kurds in Syria, let’s look at the factors underpinning the
FSA’s alliance with Ankara.
Ethnic tension between Kurds and Sunni Arabs
is surely not a sufficiently convincing explanation. On the one side, the
FSA’s resentment against the PYD arises out of the accusation that the Kurds
are complicit with the Syrian regime, and that
they are taking territories previously controlled by the Syrian opposition.
The Syrian rebels’ worst enemy remains President Bashar
al-Assad; is the FSA simply taking the chance to gain more territories and
confront the Syrian Army, or is this alliance with Turkey concealing other
factors? Recent developments might have motivated Syrians in Turkey, many of
whom have no military background, to embrace
Ankara’s tireless battle against the Kurds.
Turkey is currently hosting more than three
million Syrian refugees, mainly in Istanbul and in the provinces of the
South-East. This was promoted as the result of a generous ‘Open Door Policy’ which made
Syrians fleeing war welcome in Turkey as guests, despite not being formally
recognised as refugees, such was the rhetoric built around the values of
compassion and the duty of Islamic fraternity. However, other minority groups in Turkey claim that this
Islamic paternalism is more likely to conceal an attempt to ‘sunnify’ Turkish
society, radicalise Islam and gain political support, particularly by settling
Syrian refugees in areas where the HDP gained more votes in recent elections. An informant who requested to stay anonymous
observed an ongoing attempt to relocate Syrian refugees into Kurdish destroyed
cities such as Nusaybin, Cizre and Sur, the historical neighborhood of
Diyarbakir.
An informant who requested to stay anonymous
observed an ongoing attempt to relocate Syrian refugees into Kurdish destroyed
cities such as Nusaybin, Cizre and Sur, the historical neighborhood of
Diyarbakir. The Turkification of the Kurdish-populated regions through the settlement
of immigrants rings a bell among those familiar with Turkish history. The
Settlement Law 2510 issued in 1934 by the newly born Turkish republic aimed
at shaping demographic structures to promote assimilation and
nationalism, in the name of state security.
Foreign
policy tools?
While doing research on the humanitarian
implications of the state of emergency declared after the failed
coup in July 2016, I conducted interviews with Turkish and foreign
aid workers in the South-East, coping with the government’s crackdown on humanitarian organisations and
civil society groups there. The findings of this research disclosed the
government’s attempt to securitise foreign aid and monopolise civil society,
and the impact of such strategies on internally displaced persons.
One human rights activist interviewed in
Istanbul claimed that the Turkish government has been using Syrians as foreign
policy tools. Through a charity-based assistance, focused on the provision of
basic needs, Ankara’s generosity has gained a huge approving consensus among
refugees. The number of Syrian children born in Turkey and named after
President Recep Tayyip is a clear example of how this open door policy has nurtured
the construction of a mythical aura around Erdogan’s persona. Several
practitioners interviewed during my fieldwork argued that since the government
endeavoured to control the education offered to refugees, it has taken a much more
religious and nationalist turn. This shapes young Syrians – increasingly
integrated in Turkey – as strongly aligned with the AKP ideology. The
Turkification of Syrian refugees would ultimately benefit the government when
these guests are granted citizenship, an initiative already proposed by Erdogan. The Turkification of the Kurdish-populated regions through the settlement
of immigrants rings a bell among those familiar with Turkish history.
Another practitioner working in a humanitarian
NGO in the South-East raised their concern about the inaccessibility of the
camps set up by the state, where no NGO is allowed to enter, unless for a very
limited time and under strict surveillance: “If you have a closed place where
no one can enter, you can train the people however you want”.
Trainings for FSA members in Turkish military
camps, facilitated by the United States, have been ongoing for several years.
However, these might become surrogates for humanitarian assistance in exchange
for political support when trainees receive salary, food and shelter – all from the Turkish
government.
Saviour
or recruiting agent?
Many Syrians would be tempted to view the
Turkish government as a benevolent saviour after the state has provided them
with dozens of camps, food security and medical assistance. Nevertheless, this
can be seen as the outcome of the government’s attempt to monopolise
humanitarian efforts and clamp down on international NGOs and local civil
society organisations. Several organisations argue that governmental
agencies such as AFAD are monopolising the field of civil society, which is an
evident paradox when considering that civil society should be a space for
citizens beyond the state.
Through interviews with civil society actors,
international and local aid workers in the South-East of Turkey, I have investigated
the reasons underpinning the politically motivated crack down on NGOs. On the
one side, this is strongly intertwined with the renewed conflict in the Kurdish
region of Turkey and the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic
Party (HDP) in 2015. Moreover, having a monopoly over humanitarian and
development aid would ensure Ankara’s role in the reconstruction of its
neighboring war torn country. Lastly, the government has sustained and
established pro-government conservative organisations in order to refine the
shape of civil society and widen its political support. Through interviews with civil society actors,
international and local aid workers in the South-East of Turkey, I have investigated
the reasons underpinning the politically motivated crack down on NGOs.
In short, it is evident that both the open
door policy and the monopolisation of the aid system have become useful strategic
tools that have allowed the Turkish government to earn loyal support not only
within its citizens, but also among Syrians, to the point that the most recent
arrivals are willing to back the Turkish army in the offense against the Syrian
Kurds.
Threatening
Erdogan’s political hegemony
Ankara believes that a Kurdish corridor in
Syria near the Turkish border would motivate the Kurds to demand and fight for
an autonomous region in Turkey, which would undermine the integrity of the
state. The conflict between the PKK and the state has lasted for more than
thirty years and cost around 40,000 lives.
However, it was the AKP who endeavoured to put
an end to the so-called 'Kurdish question' as part of its political strategy
after 2007. Henri Barkey in “The Transformation of Turkey’s Kurdish Question”
(2017) describes how the AKP attempted to end hostilities between the state and
the Kurds to reduce spending and economic costs, limit the military’s power and
favour Erdogan’s foreign policy aspirations.
Moreover, the AKP established a substantial
electoral base in the South-Eastern provinces, and used different forms of state paternalism to gain consent among poorer
Kurdish communities in the region. Erdogan’s reconciliation policy culminated
with the beginning of a peace process between the state and the PKK in 2013.
But the peace negotiations were soon
interrupted and violence resumed when the HDP overcame the 10% electoral
threshold during the June 2015 elections, becoming the third largest party in
parliament. Many Kurds who traditionally voted for Erdogan
envisioned the HDP as a valid alternative to the AKP. This pro-Kurdish party,
which gained much greater secularist and leftist consent, suddenly became a
threat to Erdogan’s political hegemony, who shortly afterwards called for early
elections, in November 2015.
It has been argued that the AKP triggered the
escalation of violence to raise nationalist anger against the PKK and undermine
the HDP’s credibility in the November elections. Indeed, 1.2 million HDP voters switched in favour of
the AKP from the June to the November elections. The blessing of a large Sunni
population displaced in Turkey and leading a military offensive in Syria can be
a tantalising second chance for Erdogan to remedy his
failed policy following the Arab uprising.
Turkey’s historic Kurdish question might have
turned from threatening the integrity of the state, in the early years of the PKK,
to jeopardising Erdogan’s political party.
Gaining the support of Syrian refugees is a
strategic initiative to bolster the conservative and nationalist society that
the AKP is endeavouring to construct, and thus eradicate any ideological and
political alternative that might arise from a Kurdish front.
Receiving the blessing of a large Sunni
population displaced in Turkey and leading a military offensive in Syria can be
a tantalising second chance for Erdogan to remedy his
failed policy following the Arab uprising. Ultimately, his plans to
become a political and international leader of the Sunni hemisphere of the
Muslim world.