‘Democratic’ doublespeak in Bahrain: how the government spins its summer of repression
Bahraini anti-government protesters calling out "peaceful, peaceful," approach riot police, Jan. 7, 2012. Hasan Jamali/AP/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.Since the beginning of June, the Government of Bahrain has forcibly
exiled activist Zainab al-Khawaja; denaturalized
the country’s most prominent Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim; dissolved the largest
opposition group, Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society; rearrested celebrated
human rights defender Nabeel Rajab; brought criminal charges
against internationally-renowned interfaith leader Sheikh Maytham al-Salman; and
judicially
harassed more than 60 Shia religious figures on allegations linked solely to sermons and peaceful
demonstrations.
Can you spot
the “democratic triumph?”
Khalifa Alfadhel, a law professor at the University of Bahrain and a
royally-appointed member of the Bahrain Institute for Political Development
(BIPD) run by the Minister of Information Affairs, seems to think it’s obvious.
In two similar articles recently submitted to RealClearPolitics
and openDemocracy
– “Bahrain's Little Known Democratic Move” and “The suspension of Wefaq: a triumph
for democracy in Bahrain” – Alfadhel characterizes 2016 as a watershed year for
the country, asserting that the government has finally defeated the forces of
“neomedievalism” in the name of “pluralism, tolerance and political liberalism”
by closing Al-Wefaq and prohibiting
religious leaders from political participation. But the problem isn’t simply that Alfadhel’s writing is rife with misinformation; it’s that he presents his unsubstantiated allegations as independent commentary.
Addressing US policymakers in the first
article, Alfdahel appeals to a caricature of secularism, Iranophobia, and anti-Islamist
anxiety, writing: “Some have characterized Al-Wefaq as an ‘opposition’ party in
Bahrain. This is not the whole truth…Al-Wefaq, in fact, is a proxy for Iran in
Bahrain. It is a radical Shiite religious organization masquerading as a
political party.”
As noted by nearly every independent
NGO and foreign
government outside the GCC, this is indeed far from the whole truth.
But
the problem isn’t simply that Alfadhel’s writing is rife with
misinformation; it’s that he presents his unsubstantiated allegations as
independent
commentary. Rather, his articles clearly fit a broader pattern of
“strategic
sectarianism” – a state-sponsored media offensive to discredit any opposition
with a mix of baseless accusation and deceptive self-congratulation.
To borrow
from Gulf scholars Marc
Owen Jones and Justin
Gengler, it is through the targeted “instrumentalization of sectarian
rhetoric” that the Bahraini government has actively positioned
itself as both “a primary source of, and self-styled solution to, the
sectarian-based insecurity” generated by persistent political marginalization. Nearly
identical arguments can be found in everything from automated
Twitter accounts to official media,
including statements by
Alfahdel’s superior, the Information Affairs Minister.
If such discourse reveals anything of substance, then, it’s the enduring
sectarian framework undergirding the government’s sustained, violent, and
recently intensified campaign against dissident voices. Alfadhel’s essays are
demonstrative, affording an opportunity to deconstruct the Orwellian language
of sectarian authoritarianism facilitating the symbiotic relationship between
religious discrimination and wholesale repression in Bahrain.
Ultimately, the sloppy
invocation of ‘liberal’ watchwords unintentionally emphasizes the monarchy’s willingness
to trample the most basic of democratic values – free belief, expression, assembly,
and association – in order to further disenfranchise the country’s restive
majority.
The repeated use of the word “party,” for example, belies the disingenuous
presumption that Bahrain operates as a party democracy: it doesn’t. Formal
political parties remain
illegal and elections are only held for the lower house of parliament, a
severely-constrained legislative body subservient to both the royally-appointed
upper house and the king. With the closure of Al-Wefaq, it seems increasingly
likely that the government may altogether prohibit “political societies,” the
ambiguous form of political association currently permitted in Bahrain. With the closure of Al-Wefaq, it seems increasingly likely that the government may altogether prohibit “political societies,” the ambiguous form of political association currently permitted in Bahrain.
Alfadhel similarly praises the government’s recent amendment
to the political society legislation – which forbids religious figures from
discussing politics during sermons or participating in societies – as a
positively Jeffersonian accomplishment: “This prohibition is perhaps the most
significant step towards democracy in Bahrain's contemporary political
history.” He makes no mention of how the ‘ban on turbans’ – as it is reportedly
known
within the diplomatic community – has been “exclusively”
used to target Shia leaders, despite the existence of a Sunni Islamist
movement.
Alfadhel additionally fails to reconcile this purported commitment to
secular governance with his open
admiration for Saudi Arabia – a theologically-grounded absolute monarchy –
and its supposed war against Islamist “intolerance” in the form of Iran. Apparently
“neomedievalism” only applies to Shia political movements.
Notably, the government has matched this latest wave of strategic
sectarianism with longstanding forms of electoral gerrymandering and
demographic engineering meant to undermine majority participation in the
political process. Bahraini
authorities have for decades engaged in discriminatory political districting to dilute Shia voting power, amplify that of government
supporters, and specifically prevent Al-Wefaq from securing a larger proportion
of ballots.
Despite Alfadhel’s pretenses, Gengler recently found that redistricting along “sectarian lines” has also largely hurt the
“electoral prospects of populist and secular candidates,” resulting in a lower
house “permanently divided among Sunni Islamists [and] loyalist tribal
‘independents’” following Al-Wefaq’s 2014 boycott and subsequent dissolution.
At the same time, as documented
by UN experts, the
government has increased its use of arbitrary denaturalization orders to punish
and ultimately deport hundreds of predominantly Shia activists, critics, and
human rights defenders. The counterpart to this policy – the government’s naturalization of thousands of foreign Sunni security
personnel – has served the complementary purpose of boosting its Sunni support
base and “praetorianizing” the security apparatus against Bahrain’s
majority population.
Why does Bahrain’s “democratic triumph” seem so patently illiberal?
Maybe it’s because 2016 truly is a watershed year for Bahrain, as Alfadhel
suggested – the year sectarian authoritarianism is finally whitewashed as
progressive reform. Dismissing the 2011 pro-democracy movement in which more
than half Bahrain’s citizen population participated as an “Iranian-backed
sectarian uprising,” Alfadhel asserts
that the government must continue to “exclude intolerant actors who do not
adhere to democratic principles,” “obstruct the social contract,” and “subvert
the will of the Shiite electorate.” Maybe it’s because 2016 truly is a watershed year for Bahrain, as Alfadhel suggested – the year sectarian authoritarianism is finally whitewashed as progressive reform.
In Alfadhel’s take on liberal political
theory, it’s not a near-absolute monarchy that obstructs the social
contract; rather, it’s the monarchy alone that can safeguard democracy from the
masses. Further, the king and his government must not only determine the content
of democratic principles but even the will of the Shia majority, some of which
Alfadhel has referred
to by the sectarian derogation “rejectionist.”
In addition to this paternalistic excuse for democratic reform, the
government has also calibrated its use of sectarian rhetoric to rouse US, UK,
and GCC security concerns over Iranian influence while obscuring broader
restrictions on any form of dissent, Shia or otherwise. Despite the conclusion
of the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which found no evidence of Iranian involvement
in the country’s pro-democracy movement, Bahraini authorities have consistently
painted peaceful demonstrators as a radical pro-Iranian fifth column.
In an
automated version of Alfadhel’s recycled arguments, Jones recently found
that the government and/or pro-government supporters have created hundreds of
fake Twitter accounts for the express purpose of “repeating propaganda that
conflates acts of violence, terrorism, and unrest, with both Arab Shia and Iran.”
Though Twitter took note of his investigation and blocked some 1,800 automated
accounts, sectarian “bots” remained responsible
for more than half the Tweets posted under #Bahrain this past June.
When the time is right – and often inadvertently aided by Iranian
posturing – Bahraini authorities have capitalized on this securitized
sectarianism, cashing in fickle ‘democratic’ concessions for US defense
assistance. In the midst of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, for example, the Bahraini
government’s early release
of the former secretary-general of the Wa’ad opposition society, Ibrahim Sharif,
prompted the US State Department to lift a punitive arms ban. But once American
weapons sales resumed, the authorities quickly rearrested Sharif on charges
related solely to his political speeches – a rapid about-face that has become
an increasingly common government tactic.
This case is particularly instructive for understanding Bahrain’s instrumentalized
sectarianism, however, because Sharif is not a Shia religious figure; he’s
Sunni and Wa’ad consists primarily of left-leaning secularists. In 2011, a
military court sentenced Sharif to five years in prison for peacefully
criticizing the government and calling for a “republican system.” Sharif served
four years of that sentence as well as a subsequent one-year term, but the
prosecution has appealed
in the latter case with the intent of extending his incarceration. Is Sharif also some illiberal bogeyman threatening Alfadhel’s fledgling, secular democracy?
Is Sharif also some illiberal bogeyman threatening Alfadhel’s fledgling,
secular democracy? Or is he representative of the thousands of Bahraini
prisoners of conscience held solely for political or religious beliefs,
thousands of “little known” victims to a deepening authoritarianism shielded by
strategic sectarianism? Given the current scale of repression in Bahrain, the
real answer becomes more obvious with each passing day.
Ultimately, if the government continues to imprison or deport every
critical voice – under the cover of a shrewdly curated sectarian narrative – Alfadhel’s
distortion of democracy may well triumph in Bahrain. By that point you
certainly won’t hear any opposition.