Putin’s partition plans and the politics of cynicism

Reports of
a Russian military presence in Latakia, as well as lingering suspicion of both wider
logistical and intelligence support to the Bashar Al Assad regime, add a new
dimension to Vladimir Putin’s motives in the Syrian conflict. There have also
been claims that Russian military technical personnel have taken over the
running of key airports including Damascus international airport. The ongoing
Syrian tragedy has demonstrated more than anything else that Putin is the consummate
opportunist. While his endgame is still open to question, he has been masterful
and ruthless in taking advantage of President Obama’s jelly-kneed foreign
policy and European divisions to expand Russian influence in the world to
levels reminiscent of the Cold War era.

According
to reports, Moscow and Damascus have revived the terms of the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1980 by the Soviet Union and Syria; these
terms have allowed Russian forces to establish airbases in the predominately
Alawite western coastal portion of the country. There has been no official
confirmation of this agreement, and while Washington has expressed concern
about growing Russian military involvement in Syria it is not yet clear if the
Cold War treaty or any elements of it have indeed been reactivated.

What is
evident is that Russian military involvement appears to be increasingly focused
on propping up the Assad regime and, more tellingly, defending its Alawite
heartland. These actions have been widely interpreted as contributing to what
is thought to be Moscow’s endgame: a partitioned Syria in which Russia establishes
a firm foothold and obedient ally on the eastern Mediterranean.

That Putin would relish the opportunity to achieve
what the Soviet Union at the height of its power never managed is beyond doubt. The more interesting question is
whether the Syrian regime will go along with his plans. Recent trends in world
affairs and the Middle East suggest that Bashar Assad and his close cohort of
advisers have been pushed into Putin’s arms.

That Putin would relish the opportunity to achieve what the Soviet Union at the height of its power never managed is beyond doubt.

Despite the
mainstream view that the US-Iranian thaw in relations following the nuclear
agreement would strengthen Assad’s position, there is the risk of the opposite
consequence. While the Iranians have staunchly supported the Syrian government,
mainly through the military support provided by the proxy group Hezbollah, Damascus
has to consider the possibility that growing cooperation between Tehran and
Washington could come at its expense. Moreover, the growing power of the
Iranian-backed military forces in Syria has paralleled the steady erosion of the
effectiveness of the Syrian army, which has seen a decline in terms of its
numbers and fighting capability.

Iran’s
growing military influence on the ground has, according to various reports, led
to divisions among Syria’s ruling elite, including the Alawite community. Sunni
supporters of the regime, including the former intelligence chief Rustom
Ghazali, have openly refused to heed Iranian orders. Secular-minded Alawites and
Syrian nationalists similarly rejected a military takeover by the radical Shia
Iranian forces, and have sought to curtail their influence.

The reality
is that the size and role of Russian forces so far have been limited. It thus
seems logical that the Syrian regime would invite Russian forces into Syria—particularly
into the Alawite regions—as a counterbalance to the Iranians rather than
specifically to fight on the frontline on its behalf, which Moscow would not
accept anyway.

On the
international stage, Moscow has proven to be a far more effective friend to the
Assad regime than the Iranians. Aside from blocking international efforts to
stop the war in Syria, which included several UN Security Council resolutions,
Moscow has recently played a role in re-establishing contacts between Damascus
and major countries in the region. Ali Mamluk, the current leading security
adviser for Assad, was recently dispatched to Saudi Arabia and Egypt as part of
renewed diplomatic efforts instigated by Moscow.

Ostensibly,
Russia has been calling for an international and Arab coalition to fight Da’esh
and other Islamic extremists in Syria, and Ali Mamluk’s visits were explained
in that context. The more realistic analysis, based on leaked reports, suggests
that the message from Damascus and Moscow to the Saudis was simple: support the
Assad regime in order to roll back Hezbollah and Iranian influence in Syria.

The question
for the west now is whether to confront or to mollify Putin. His cynicism and
the obvious pleasure he takes in his role as spoiler has become widely
accepted. Besides partitioning Ukraine and undermining US credibility, Moscow
has helped create a refugee crisis for Europe, which it can monitor with glee.
More importantly, it has established itself as a genuine powerbroker in the
Middle East and reinvented itself as a major arms supplier. That it can now
even consider the prospect of making a geo-strategically vital segment of
territory south of Turkey and east of the Mediterranean as de facto Russian
land must be a mouth-watering prospect for Putin, despite the horrific
humanitarian cost.