Post-conflict in Colombia: The international potential of peace
Demonstration against violence in Colombia. Flickr. Some rights reserved.
If
everything goes according to plan,
the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) will be signing in the coming
weeks an agreement to put an end
to more than 50 years
of armed conflict. This is
certainly momentous news for Colombia, but
also for the international community,
which has expressed unanimous support
for the process currently under way in Havana. Much has been said about the role of the international community
in achieving peace and implementing the future agreement. I would like to propose here an analysis of
the other side of the coin: the
meaning and impact of this process on the international
scene.
The
anomaly
To
many international
analysts and Latin American political
actors, the armed conflict in Colombia
was, to some extent, an anomaly or an exception[1]. The fall of the Berlin
Wall triggered or accelerated peace processes in Central American countries. Since the late 70s and
early 80s, political transition processes had begun there from the once-dominant military dictatorships to democratic regimes.
The influence of the United States fluctuated between
active support to the democratic cause during the Carter administration, the
campaign against the "evil
empire" under Reagan, then towards appeasement
and new democratic emphasis under President George Bush
Sr. This swinging back and forth caused
deep geopolitical changes in Latin America[2].
The
backdrop and ulterior purpose of the centre-stage role of Latin America in the peace processes in
Central America (for
example, in the Contadora Group) was
the resolution of all ideologically-based
armed conflicts. The presumption was
that once the wars in Guatemala, Nicaragua and
El Salvador were appeased, the impact
of the success of these processes
would naturally open a peace process in Colombia.
The Colombian constituent process
of the nineties is coincidental with widespread
optimism about the beneficial effects
of the end of the Cold War. The peace negotiations and the disarming and demobilization of several Colombian
guerrilla groups were seen as confirming the Latin American chapter
of the "end of history".
But,
as we know, the war in Colombia went on and became increasingly
toxic due to the increasing overlap of its actors with
drug trafficking and other illegal economies. In addition to Colombia, only Peru was going through a bloody internal conflict with the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). To any observer, it was no coincidence that the two countries most affected by coca cultivation and trafficking were suffering the brunt of violence.
This
coincidence – while peace was being signed in
El Salvador and Guatemala in 1992
and 1996 respectively – implied a different
analysis of the roots of conflict.
Led by the vision in Washington, the conflicts
were interpreted as a direct and almost
immediate consequence of drug
trafficking and, therefore, their solution had to be found in a head-on struggle with the drug cartels and
through aggressive crop eradication and prohibition
policies. Latin
American countries were mostly absent from these discussions, losing the centre-stage
role they had had in Central America[3].
The
war ended in Peru during
the 90s, more
as a result of police and intelligence successes, and the rejection by civilians of the illegal groups, than to the fight against
drug trafficking. The enormous
corruption that held together the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000)
showed also that those fighting
subversion are not always
interested in concrete and public interest results.
In any case, the armed conflict in Colombia continued and
extended through the brutal
presence of paramilitary groups.
From
justice and peace to Havana
The
demobilization process of most
of the blocks and paramilitary groups in Colombia was a result of a negotiation the full reach of which is
still unknown, unrelated to international
intervention. On the
contrary, some external agencies viewed the
scheme with suspicion, blaming it
for being ineffective and promoting impunity, especially
after the extradition of the main
paramilitary leaders to the United States.
International support materialised, rather, for the
management of the consequences of the enforcement
of the law, such as the land restitution act, and, under Santos,
the launching of a system of assistance to victims of the conflict.
The
peace process in Havana was also a product basically drawn, designed and executed by the parties. Facilitators, associates,
and other international actors were
useful in resolving specific crises,
giving confidence to the FARC, providing logistical
aid, and expanding consultations. Resolution 2261 (2016) of
the United Nations Security Council consolidated a process of increasing participation and
oversight by the international community.
Peace
in Colombia as a global opportunity
The peace process in Colombia
has been welcomed with open arms by the international community,
which is burdened with some intractable conflicts,
growing tensions and new failed states. Unanimous international support
for the talks in Havana is an expression of complacency with this process, a reaction that is almost
unique if we compare it to the heavy boxing going on in
the discussions on Syria, North Korea, and Iran. Talking Colombia in
the international sphere tempers
the spirits and pacifies relations[4].
At the same
time, the forthcoming Colombian post-conflict is an opportunity not only for Colombia, but
for the recent experience in United Nations peacekeeping operations. There has been
much questioning, for example, of UN peacekeepers
taking military action against armed groups in African countries and of security interventions not being consistently supported
by other components. In terms of results, the balance
is dismal, as can be seen in Burundi and South Sudan.
The
nature of an accompanying civil
mission is consistent with the post-conflict requirements in Colombia,
and eases the concerns of countries contributing human and financial
resources to peacekeeping operations around the world. It remains to be seen, however, how soundly
do countries which effectively provide
personnel to any such operations located in high-risk areas
sleep, but the experience of the
civil and unarmed mission of the Peace Support Mission of the Organization of American States (MAPP-OEA)
shows that security on the ground
does not have much to do with bulletproof
vests and armored vans,
and more with a deep understanding of
the context and with constantly measuring
the threats.
And
an opportunity for Latin America
If
successful, the international
mission in Colombia may carry
important lessons for similar operations
in other parts of the world,
but the impact in Latin America should not be underestimated, even though it is of a
different kind.
Peace
in Colombia would put an end to the anomaly mentioned above – although it would
still leave several pending questions – and
lead the country into a more
"normal" relationship with its
neighbours. For years, the
Colombian foreign policy has
revolved around its own armed
conflict. Its friends and foes have had to do with the positions and attitudes of other countries on Colombian domestic violence. As if the country was a sort of South
American Israel, Colombian
diplomacy has suffered from some
degree of defensive cloistering.
But
at the same time,
relations with other countries and, more
generally, the inclusion of Colombia
in the regional context,
may change substantially, although
gradually. After some prominence in the eighties, Colombia has been absent from the hemispheric crises, such as the coups in Honduras and Paraguay
or the latent conflicts
on yet-to-be-defined borders. Its participation in the Organization of American
States has been faint, as has its role in promoting other sub-regional trade agreements or blocks, such as
UNASUR (with which it maintains a
quiet animosity) and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (Colombia being the
only middle-economy country absent)[5].
A Colombia at peace
would open up significant prospects
for a country that has an undeniable
geostrategic location, being a natural
bridge between the Andean region,
Central America, the Caribbean and the Amazon. No other
nation in the region has Colombia’s potential for
strengthening regional integration on water, energy and communications resources. And no
other actor in the neighbourhood has
shown such a political and macroeconomic stability,
despite its internal weaknesses and frailties.
That the war in Colombia has deprived the region
of a consistent and relevant actor for a better consolidation of Mercosur, for example, for being more serious
about UNASUR, and for an objective discussion
of the relationship of the region with the US, has certainly been a tragic anomaly.
The
impact of peace in Colombia will be felt particularly
in Venezuela. Somehow,
while the former moves
hesitantly towards greater stability, the latter is rapidly plunging into political and social chaos. All
forecasts are pointing to an implosion
of tremendous proportions as a result of the erosion of the Bolivarian regime and huge
uncertainty about how the
Venezuelan transition will turn out to be. President Santos is
right in saying that what keeps him awake at
night is Venezuela[6].
The
border closure crisis in October last
year was only a
small sample of the instability waves that may be coming. Even if the peace process with the FARC appears to have been isolated from the vicissitudes of Venezuela, there are many other potentially dangerous
elements at play. On the one hand,
the National
Liberation Army (ELN) will hardly enter into negotiations if the scene in its main refuge remains unstable. On the other hand, implementing
the agreements with the FARC
will be very difficult in key regions such as Arauca and Catatumbo North.
Finally, the clash of these two
countries has practically destroyed legal trade, which is the source of enormous resources and opportunities for both.
Colombia is expected to play
a positive role in a major crisis in Venezuela.
Not only for its own short-term interest, but because it is perhaps one of the few countries that can have an impact, given Venezuela’s growing food dependency. So far, Colombian diplomacy has been low-key and, again, too focused on Venezuela’s role in the armed conflict. It is time to push UNASUR and the OAS into taking concrete steps to prevent Colombia’s anomaly from being replaced by an even scarier
Venezuelan anomaly.
Overall, the economic slowdown and the crisis of the left
populist regimes in
Latin America will open new, no less
fearsome challenges. If Colombia succeeds in overcoming ideological
violence, it must show the region
that it is possible to reduce
inequality and respect the rule
of law, an equation that has been
difficult to come by in the region in the last decade.
Conclusion
Peace in Colombia is undoubtedly
good news for the international
community and for the region. The
participation (hopefully proactive
and instrumental) of Colombian citizens
is crucial to sail
in the dangerous waters of the post-conflict.
But also, in the
medium and long term, a Colombia
in peace should be welcomed by the region because
it means the return to the neighbourhood of an important, relevant resident, with first-order hemispheric tasks ahead.
[1] Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims (CHCV): Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto
armado en Colombia, February 15, 2015. The documents by Alfredo Molano and Sergio de
Zubiría are particularly useful for this reflection.
[2] Daniel Pécaut, Las FARC: ¿una
guerrilla sin fin o sin fines?, grupo editorial Norma, 2008.
[3] Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin (eds), Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, The
Impact of U.S. Policy, Boulder, 2005.
[4] Amanda Taub, At last, some really good news: Colombia´s war with FARC could finally
end, January 28, 2016, Vox The Latest.
[5] A critical (and official) analysis
is unusually to be found in the 2010
Report of the Foreign Policy Mission, published by the Universidad
Militar Nueva Granada on April 19, 2010. For an external critical view: Alfredo Molano Rojas, Política
exterior, crónica de males crónicos, UN Periódico Number 135, July 2010.
[6] See the Crisis Group reports: Venezuela:
un desastre evitable, July 30, 2015, and Fin de la hegemonía: ¿qué sigue para Venezuela?, December 21, 2015.
The quote about the
nightmares of President Santos
comes from a Blu Radio interview, February 3, 2016.