Chilcot: all peaceful options were not exhausted

Tony Blair facing growing calls to be brought to court following damning verdict of the Chilcot Report. Stefan Rousseau / Press Association. All rights reserved.In October 2002, the Oxford Research Group were
approached by a senior Middle Eastern Prince with strong working ties to Saddam
Hussein. The Prince wanted to become an interlocutor to talk to Saddam Hussein as
part of attempts to avert war. He proposed to explore whether the Iraqi ruler could
be coaxed into a quiet passage out of his country, somewhat in the spirit of
Napoleon to Elba.

From previous experience he believed that he might
have influence over that unpredictable and ruthless character, not least
because of his Hashemite roots to the Kingdom of Iraq, founded in
1921 under British administration. He wanted to engage
quietly behind the scenes, out of the glare of any publicity, but it was
important for him that he had the authority and backing of the British
government. This would be both clandestine and deniable, but it would give him
an increased legitimacy in his negotiations.

At the same time, Oxford Research Group was deeply
troubled by the building momentum for the invasion of Iraq. Colleagues from the
region understood the potential to unleash forces of instability and chaos that
would destabilize the balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well
as creating the chaotic conditions in which Al-Qaida could flourish.

Of course there was no certainty that the Prince’s
initiative would have been successful, but perhaps what was most significant
was the total lack of interest on the part of the British government to take
such proposals seriously. They were dismissive and saw no traction in exploring
it. It became clear that minds had been made up. A particular path was being
pursued and alternative routes for engaging with Saddam Hussein were dismissed
as naïve.

Not only was the UK government deaf to advice from
those who were from the region and therefore understood the politics, the
culture, and the history in more depth, there was also a sense of hunkering
down to prepare for the military option. In discussion it became clear that the
UK government was holding to a tunnel-vision.  

The Chilcot Report could not be more clear that
“peaceful options were not exhausted”. Another potential opportunity was
presented in December
2002, when a representative of the head of Iraqi Intelligence contacted a former
head of CIA counterintelligence. The Iraqi official stated that Saddam knew
there was a campaign to link him to the horrific events of 9/11, insisting that
he had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. This key informant added that the
Iraqis were able to show these concerns were unfounded. This conversation was
reported to senior officials in the State Department, but there was no real interest.
Once again minds were closed, because the Bush administration had already decided
on regime change and anything less was unacceptable.

In December 2002, Scilla Elworthy was contacted by the former first lady
of Greece, Margarita Papandreou, to help lead a delegation of female leaders of
the Middle East to push initiatives to avoid war in Iraq. After
a long struggle to get visas and an equal struggle to actually get to Baghdad, the
delegation finally arrived on January 3, 2003. To enter the hotel the group had
to walk over a mosaic in the entrance floor that depicted the face of George
Bush – a piece of Iraqi irony not lost on the many journalists staying there.

Having teamed up with senior UN
officials whom were known and trusted, they met  with Iraqi cabinet ministers and officials
including Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, Foreign Minister Nagi Sabri, and
Oil Minister Amer Mohammed Rashid, as well as with doctors, teachers, and
scientists. They had plenty of opportunity to meet ordinary Iraqis and visit
sites recently inspected for weapons of mass destruction.

After seven days, Scilla wrote her
first daily blog[1],
and the group had collected enough information to write a two-page proposal to
Tony Blair, outlining  in ten points how
war could be avoided. It was placed in Blair’s hands a few days later. It was reported
that he read it quickly and said, “It’s too late.” For Blair, it was. Two
months later we discovered that irreversible machinery for the US/UK invasion
had been set in motion the previous October and that Blair had given Bush his
unconditional support a year previously.

All these examples highlight how for a
small cabal of decision-makers, once decided to go to war, any alternatives
were merely a distraction. Hans Blix confirms this. He personally made a
telephone call to Blair on February 20, 2003. He told Blair, after many
hundreds of inspections, that they had yielded no evidence of a WMD programme.
He even said ‘it would prove absurd if 200,000 troops were to invade Iraq and
find very little’. Yet another example that once minds are made up the road to
war is inevitable.

Tony Blair told the Chilcot enquiry
that Saddam Hussein
was “a man to whom a last chance to do right is just a further opportunity to
do wrong. He is blind to reason.” This
may have been an accurate assessment, but like all personalities, however
ruthless and cruel their behavior is and has been, there is always a desire for survival. The failure of military intervention and its
catastrophic consequences demand that we exhaust all peaceful options prior to
military engagement. This was not done.  

[1] Scilla Elworthy, “Waiting for the Dawn: A
Baghdad Diary,” Open Democracy, January 14, 2003,
www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraqwarquestions/Article _885.jsp.