Estonia’s populist and radical right: how radical are they?
Police launch tear gas at right-wing and far-right protesters rallying against the Global Compact for Migration in front of EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 16, 2018. Ye Pingfan/ Press Association. All rights reserved.
The Estonian
Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) polled as the third
most popular party throughout 2017 and 2018. Chairman
Mart Helme and his son and Vice-Chairman Martin Helme have been reiterating
that EKRE is a party with a purely civic
profile in its political engagement, without links to
militant grass-roots groupings. How close are these allegations to the truth?
Radical right-wing parties and militant groupings: three types of connection
There is a
sub-category of radical right-wing parties that represent the consolidation of bottom-up
formation processes; spearheaded by a political (frequently semi-paramilitary)
nucleus. These parties maintain an identitarian profile, opt for militant patterns
of political engagement, and have often been accused of displaying anti-democratic
tendencies. This sub-category has been successful
in augmenting popularity along the eastern part of the continent and comprises
parties such as: Bulgaria’s Ataka, Greece’s Golden Dawn, Slovakia’s ‘Our
Slovakia’/Naše
Slovensko and Hungary’s Jobbik (at least prior
to its recent ‘de-radicalization’
process).
Within this
sub-category, one can differentiate between three types of linkages between the
political organizations of such radical right-wing parties and more militant
groupings. The first one is centralized. In accordance to this type, the purely
political and the more militant branches form a coherent whole without a
discernible division of labour. One representative party of this variant is Golden
Dawn. Especially between 2011 and 2013, Golden Dawn operated
as a centralized, extra-institutional actor with the objective of combating
‘immigrant criminality’ in its street-level engagements.
The second
type has an umbrella pattern, with a formal demarcation between the political
and the militant branches. The latter appear to maintain an organizational
autonomy and operate as semi-structured (unarmed) militias that have drawn
their inspiration from far-right groupings in the political past of their
countries. Two examples of the umbrella pattern are Jobbik
and Naše Slovensko.
The former utilized the militia under its auspices (Hungarian
Guard/Magyar Gárda) against
‘Gypsy crime’ in a string of self-styled operations, throughout the
northeast of Hungary, between 2007 and 2011. The latter have engaged its militia
(Slovak Brotherhood/Slovenská Pospolitosť)
in mass mobilization against the EU quotas for refugees since the second half
of 2015. The third
type of linkage can be tentatively defined as a pattern for coexisting… even if these parties do
not officially host militant groupings under their auspices.
The third
type of linkage can be tentatively defined as a pattern for coexisting. Here, the
parties in question endorse a model of political engagement with which they
strive to promote
their cause(s) principally (or exclusively) via parliamentary and other
democratic institutions and procedures. Nevertheless, even if these parties do
not officially host militant groupings under their auspices, they seem to ‘tolerate’
the presence of the latter in their public events. Between 2015 and 2016,
Latvia’s National Alliance/Nacionālā
Apvienība did not seem to oppose the presence of grass-roots
groupings such as the Guardians of the Fatherland in demonstrations against the refugee quotas. In
Estonia, groupings such as the ‘Soldiers of Odin’ are becoming visible more
frequently in the public happenings organized by EKRE.
Links between national-conservative parties and extra-parliamentary
militant far-right groupings in Estonia
The Estonian
context, given recent pre-electoral developments in the country, provide us
with a good opportunity to shed further light on the model of coexistence and
convergence. Following a stage of marked decline, the debate on immigration
(and more broadly on multi-culturalism) has experienced a revival relating to
the ratification of the UN-sponsored Global
Compact on Refugees. The issue has created acute
divisions within the ranks of the governmental coalition and given new oxygen
to the ethno-nationalist front, both within and outside parliament.
While EKRE
and its youth organization – Blue Awakening – have been among the key
mobilizers of dissent and organized a number of protests and rallies, other
groups have colonized the same political space and rallied around the same
flag, among them the NGO ‘Sovereign Movement Smart and Healthy Estonia’ –
established former EKRE member Maria Kaljuste. The movement organized a large
protest against the ratification of the UN compact open
to all citizens and every organization which takes a stand ‘against foolishness
in Estonia's foreign policy and for the preservation of sovereignty and freedom
of speech’. The protest attracted wide media attention and mostly provided a
megaphone to those voices portraying governing elites as corrupt, globalist,
and anti-national. The organizers also petitioned
for the resignation of the country’s president for:
“having gotten involved in internal politics
by actively supporting and pushing through the Marrakesh migration pact… Kersti
Kaljulaid is directly undermining Estonia's constitutional order and the goals
of the functioning of the state as outlined in the Constitution, thus
committing treason.”
Many
political observers have noticed how the most recent anti-immigration protests
relating to the debate on the UN compact have displayed comparatively higher
levels of violent rhetoric and political heat, reflecting a degree of
polarization never previously experienced in the Estonian context and a growing
cleavage between the imperatives of societal openness and closeness.
Protests in 2016 against Angela Merkel's refugee policy in front of the cathedral in Tallinn, Estonia. Alexander Welscher/ Press Association. All rights reserved.The
protesters attending those rallies often resort to blatant hate speech –
involving racist jibes, insults, and verbal and figurative violence – such as
in the case of the picketing organized by EKRE in front of the parliament the
day of the parliamentary vote on the UN compact when posters were exhibited depicting
the hanging of some members of government. On the same occasion, Member of the
European Parliament and candidate of the Social-Democratic Party, Indrek Tarand
was attacked
by the mob while trying to address the protesting crowd. The leadership of EKRE
declined to condemn the event instead
filing a criminal complaint against the victim. In most recent gatherings members of the Soldiers of Odin were
visible, often serving as a sort of informal event safety patrol.
One frequently
cited reason behind such increasingly condoned violence is the more frequent
participation of extreme groupings such as the ‘Soldiers of Odin’ at rallies, which seems to
reflect a higher level of acceptability on the part EKRE’s establishment and a declining
sense of having to distance mainstream national-conservatism from the militant
far-right. In most recent gatherings members of the Soldiers of Odin were
visible, often serving as a sort of informal event safety patrol. This
represents a big boost in self-confidence for a group defined two years ago as
being only ‘one step away from little green men’ by the current vice-president
of the European Commission, Andrus Ansip.
This converging pattern of a more comfortable coexistence
between the two is also visible in the social media environment where more and
more frequently the same sources and discussion fora are shared. A good example
is the Facebook
group ‘Soldiers of Odin – Estonia’, generally featuring
pictures of the local groups’ anti-immigration city patrolling, but
increasingly sharing material directly from more mainstream nationalist sources
such as ‘Smart and Healthy Estonia’, EKRE, EKRE MP Jaak Madison’s personal
page, and EKRE outlet ‘Uus Uudised’ as well as (surprisingly) audio-visual
material from the Kremlin-backed RT.
Polarisation
In this
respect, it seems that the growing polarisation of the debate on refugees and
multi-culturalism has provided fertile ground for a growing degree of mutual acceptability
between groupings such as the ‘Soldiers of Odin’ and the national-conservative
side of the political spectrum, given the latter’s recent political
assertiveness and further distancing from political correctness.
The
increasingly dichotomous narrative adopted by EKRE between the nation and the
traitors (enemies of the nation) perfectly reflects this trend and hastens the growing
rapprochement with more extreme, extra-parliamentary, groupings. At the same
time, following a period of decreased relevance of the refugee-related debate,
this ratification of the highly contested UN migration compact has provided the
opportunity the group needed to move away from its marginality and regain the
centre-stage, by joining the EKRE-led choir advocating the protection of the
Estonian nation-state.