Has Sisi lost control over state repression?

Egypt is currently undergoing one of the worst periods of repression
in its modern history. Thousands languish in overcrowded prisons, hundreds have
been sentenced to death, and the use of sexual violence is unprecedented.

There has been a qualitative change in the nature of state violence in
Egypt. During the years of the Mubarak regime, the state used violence and
torture, as it does now, but its use was kept at a level that was socially
acceptable to the urban middle class. A class that was largely immune to such violence.

Although the judiciary played its role in state repression, there was the appearance of the rule of law and due process; here the word ‘appearance’ is
critical. Additionally, the methods of torture were less severe and less
shocking to the conservative sensibilities of the middle class.

For example, the use of sexual violence was not as widespread. Now, it
seems that the full fury of the state has been unleashed, with disregard for the old
self-imposed restrictions that kept certain social segments largely safe.

This, however, does not mean that the Mubarak regime did not violate
human rights regularly; but his ‘style’ of repression was more politically savvy,
and targeted lower segments of society, which allowed him to maintain a façade
of civility internationally and to the urban middle class.

The current levels of violence seem to be counterproductive to the
stability of the regime. On the one hand, the regime’s international image has
been badly shaken. Even though there is no real international pressure to halt abuses,
it has become clear, unlike the previous dictatorship that hid behind the guise
of a “liberal autocracy”, that the current regime is a full-blown military
dictatorship.

Sisi’s recent trip to Germany, accompanied by Egypt’s superstars, is
an indication of how concerned the regime is with its deteriorating
international image.

On the other hand, this level of random and unprecedented repression
has expanded to include supporters of the regime who have run afoul of the
security apparatus, mostly for non-political reasons. For example, a lawyer’s
strike recently took place due to a police officer attacking a lawyer. This situation forced
Sisi to issue a public apology criticising the police force.

Control over repression seems to have moved from the centre of the
executive branch of the government to its periphery, as repression has become
an end in itself rather than a tool for maintaining the regime’s stability.

Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that there are internal
factions inside the state competing for power, and as a result central control
over repression has been weakened.

For example, there were a number of leaks from Sisi’s office that
exposed the direct relationship the military has with media outlets, especially
famous talk show hosts who played a significant role in ousting the Muslim
Brotherhood. These leaks could have only been made possible with the
cooperation of other branches of the security apparatus.

What is also quite unexpected is that Al-Ahram, the largest government newspaper in Egypt, and Al Masry Al Youm, an independent
newspaper, both very pro-regime, have published investigations into the abysmal condition
of Egyptian prisons, reporting some of the abuses that have taken place.

These examples, combined with the proliferation of repression on a
scale that could potentially harm the current regime’s prospects, provide some
support to the notion that the Egyptian state has fallen prey to internal struggles.
However, before jumping to any conclusions, a deeper societal analysis may help
clarify the situation.

Since the 1952 coup that brought the free officers to power, the
Egyptian polity has been dominated by the military in one form or another. After
military defeat in 1967, and the collapse of Nasserism as the ideological base of
the regime, the role of the military diminished, only to maintain a role as the
protector of regime stability, acting as the backbone of the regime.

In other words, the military retreated into the background, agreeing
to share power with a junior civilian ruling partner, the National Democratic
Party (NDP), in exchange for an extensive tax-free economic empire.

As such, there was a trend of power decentralisation, where the military’s
power declined. However, the president’s position remained paramount. He had to
be from the ranks of the military, and any clash between the president and
generals always ended in favour of the president.

However, as the NDP became more powerful, it relied more on the police, which was staffed by allies, to counter the military’s power and provide support
for Gamal Mubarak (son of Hosni Mubarak) as a possible heir to his father,
against opposition by the military establishment.

The NDP became more populated by crony capitalists, who advocated for
a liberal autocracy rather than military dictatorship, and used this to
attract the support of the urban middle class, as well as the United States, in
its bid for power.

This bid for power fragmented the Egyptian ruling class, which
partially explains why the military initially sided with the protestors in
2011. It also explains the nature of repression under Mubarak’s liberal autocratic
regime; a semblance of the rule of law had to exist and control over repression
remained centralised.

The events of the Egyptian revolt and the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood have eliminated any trappings of liberalism and returned the military as the
dominating power in Egyptian politics.

However, in the process the military has systematically destroyed any
possible surrogate for civilian rule, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the NDP.
The destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood has been well documented, but that of the NDP has not.

The military has not only banished the leaders of the NDP from
politics, it has also aggressively expanded its role in the economy at the
expense of crony capitalists. It has
also extorted cash payments from these businessmen under the pretext of
donations to the “Long Live Egypt” fund.

This partially explains the reluctance of the regime to hold
parliamentary elections; there’s a lack of reliable civilian allies to populate
the assembly. Based on this, one could argue that there is a trend of power
centralisation within the Egyptian polity, which could lead to tighter controls
over the repressive apparatus of the state. However, a deeper look suggests the
contrary.

Even though the military is now the greatest power within Egyptian
polity, it suffers from a fatal flaw, which is its ideological weakness and
poor economic performance. This means the regime has to rely more on
coercion than consent to remain in power.

Under these conditions, the centre will become hostage to the
periphery, and control over ‘enforcers of repression’ will become more
difficult. If the police were to go on strike tomorrow, the regime would fall
the following day.

Additionally, the military is far from being united; there are
significant internal rivalries. The most evident of these is that of the general
intelligence agency with other branches of the military; the former became very
powerful under Omar Suliman.

Omar Suleiman was one of the possible heirs to Mubarak. Even
though he was a military man, he was disqualified from running for president during
the first transitional period when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) was running the country. Also interesting is that the head of the
general intelligence agency has been changed more than once after Omar
Suleiman, which could be an indication of the ongoing power struggle between
the different branches of the military.

Moreover, there are men affiliated with the military who have their
own ambitions for power; the most notable are the former prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, living
now in exile in the United Arab Emirates, and the former chief of staff, Sami Anan. This
competition might weaken the centre and affect its ability to control its
agents.

There are signs for the reemergence of competition between the police
and military, as clashes
have taken place between members of the two agencies. Reports of police abuse
are also very interesting, and suggest that there is a split within the security
apparatus. All of this weakens the power the centre has over its agents of
repression.

So, can El Sisi stop this infighting and regain control over
repression? To answer this question, the presidency’s power needs to be
compared to that of the military.

Based on Egypt’s current constitution, the presidency has been
weakened and the position of the military strengthened. As it stands, Sisi can remove
the defense minister but only with the military’s approval. It is important to
note that Sisi, prior to becoming the president, was a member of SCAF and the
head of the military intelligence. He had to step down from the military to
become president.

Thus, the president’s power has been diminished, and with it, the ability
to control the repressive apparatus of the state. This also indicates that the
president’s traditional role, as a stabiliser of the regime and possible power
broker, has also declined, weakening the centre and allowing for higher levels
of infighting.