The Prince: on how many fronts can Mohammad bin Salman act simultaneously?

Donald Trump meets with Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office at the White House, March 14, 2017. Picture by Pool/ABACA/ABACA/PA Images. All rights reserved. If
Machiavelli were alive today, he might
have
modeled
his political treatise ‘The
Prince’ on
Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS). Events on the first
Saturday of
November show that the young
heir apparent is confident enough to move on several fronts at the
same time on his way to what increasingly seems like concentrating
absolute power in one pair of hands: his own. 

With
the purge and detention of dozens of princes and business tycoons
(some doubling both roles), as well as (former) ministers and other
senior officials, MBS is doing two things: First of all, he is
catering to the sentiments of the average, generally young, Saudi
regarding the corrupt elites. This is a safe bet, because the
population is well aware of how princes and their coteries acquired
their wealth. Riskier, however, is the breaking of a long-held taboo:
Publicly turning on other members of the royal family. The last time
this happened openly was in 1962, when the then crown prince and
later King Faisal exiled a number of firebrand young royals. Known as
the ‘Free Princes’, their calls for reforms were considered too
radical and dangerous for the position of the dynasty. Ironically,
their ring leader is the father of one of the detained princes
Al-Waleed bin Talal.  In the present instance, the radical is
the de
facto ruler
of Saudi Arabia himself.

Much
attention is paid to a rapid succession of changes and initiatives
launched by the intrepid crown
prince,
presented as part of his Vision2030 for a future post-petroleum Saudi
Arabia: Women will not only be allowed to drive cars, but also
issue fatwas or
Islamic legal opinions. Then there is the plan for a high-tech mega
city in the country’s northwest – strategically located near the
Red Sea on the crossroads between Asia, North Africa and the
Mediterranean.  Now he personally heads  an anti-corruption
board that already seems to have a number of high-profile cases
up-and-ready. To a degree, this is all cosmetic.

Firing and detaining dozens of very senior royals and officials takes long and careful planning

More
important is the real-life Saudi version of Game
of Thrones, consisting
of a series of royal ‘musical chairs’ that started already in
2012,; three years before MBS’s father, King Salman, ascended to
the throne. Since then Saudi Arabia has had five crown princes. 
The latest changing of the guard came only this Summer. In what was
nothing short of a palace coup, MBS managed to oust his older cousin,
Muhammad bin Nayef, as both crown prince and interior minister. A
favourite of the political establishment in Washington, it says much
of MSB’s abilities as a power player. How could an experienced
political operator presiding over a massive security and intelligence
apparatus be caught so off guard?

The
same appears to be true now. Firing and detaining dozens of very
senior royals and officials takes long and careful planning,
involving substantial numbers of people. How was this kept secret?
Also why did the security detail of business tycoon Al-Waleed bin
Talal not put up a fight? Not to mention the National Guard, until
yesterday under command of Prince Miteb, the son of former King
Abdullah. Once considered next in line of the throne, even after
being side-lined from that, he managed to hold on to the powerbase
created by his father in the 1960s and build into what is effectively
a shadow army recruited from the Bedouin tribes, used to offset the
regular army and security forces of the interior ministry in a
careful balance of power between different branches of the royal
family.

It
appears MBS is set on putting an end to such balances and taking
absolute control of political power in Saudi Arabia. While the latest
purge is presented as part of an investigation into the mismanagement
of the massive floodings in the Red Sea port city of Jeddah in which
more than a hundred people died, MBS is picking off influential
figures from different sectors of Saudi society, targeting not only
fellow royals, but also cabinet members, senior administrators, and
financiers. This means that MBS can count on the loyalty of
substantial numbers of people in senior enough positions within the
bureaucracy, police and military to pull off
such operations without equally powerful people getting wind of it.

While
he appears to be successful in securing his domestic powerbase, other
events taking place on Saturday as well might throw a spanner into
the wheels of MSB’s political machine. The surprise resignation of
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, while being in Saudi Arabia, was
also more likely than not instigated by MBS as part of his rivalry
with Iran for influence and power in the Middle East. The launch of a
missile against Riyadh Airport by the Houthis in Yemen that same
evening seems too much of a coincidence. The
Houthi forces are supported by Iran in the vicious Yemen civil war,
in which Saudi Arabia became meddled up when MBS became defence
minister. Also the row with Qatar, which is jeopardizing the unity
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) fits within that scenario.
But exerting influence in international relations adds a host of
variables that might be more difficult to manage than excercising
domestic political control.

So
far MBS has managed to surprise friend and foe with his ability to
outmanoeuvre and outsmart the competition, but how long will he be
able to juggle an increasing number of balls at the same time?