The regional implications of the fall of Aleppo

Frame grab from a Dec. 13, 2016 video, shows people walking among damaged buildings on a street filled with debris near the ancient Umayyad Mosque, in the Old City of Aleppo, Syria. Uncredited/AP/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.

The recent offensive
of Assad and Russian forces in the city of Aleppo have led to the worst setback
for the opposition since the start of the war, not to mention the human
tragedy. This offensive has lead to the loss of the largest urban center under opposition control, the eastern part of Aleppo.

This is the
strongest indication yet that the tide of the civil war has shifted decisively
in favor of Assad and his allies. The possibility of the opposition in the
north of the country taking Damascus has now been greatly diminished.

As argued by Aaron Lund, the so-called southern front, which is more palpable to western powers,
has been restrained in its operations by international pressure, thus any
chance to take Damascus from the south is highly unlikely.

On the other
hand, the Idlib based opposition is highly unlikely to garner international
western support due to its strong Salafi Jihadi affiliations; while the position
of the opposition in Ghouta, in the suburbs of Damascus, is highly precarious
after years of constant siege and bombardment.

The Syrian
tragedy, and the expected fall of Aleppo, does not only have significant
effects on Syria, it also signals a significant change in the Arab world and
the positions the various powers in it hold.

The lesson Arab
autocrats are likely to learn from the Syrian civil war is simple: under the
current international climate the use of severe repression is effective as long
as the coercive arm of the state remains intact and the regime in question has
the correct set of international allies.

One only needs
to take record of the muted international response to atrocities being committed by the Assad
forces and their allies in Aleppo, which involve summary executions of civilians,
including women and children.  

Repression: a tool for regime
maintenance?

Indeed after speculations about the Syrian regime collapsing – including the Egyptian strongman Sisi – the Syrian regime, with
decisive Russian intervention, was not only able to survive but turned the tide
of the war – albeit at the cost of massive human and material destruction and
considerable decentralization.

Assad was not only
able to survive; he has also slowly started to rehabilitate himself within the
international community as the presumed lesser of two evils in the fight
against IS.

The traditional
fear of Arab autocrats from international intervention due to the use of severe
repression has faded. On the contrary, fear of refugees, civil wars and the
rise of Jihadi groups has become a tool by which Arab autocrats blackmail
western powers into silence or tacit support.

During Sisi’s visit
to Portugal, for example, he stressed the “suffering” that would take
place if a civil war were to erupt in Egypt, and the regional destabilization this
would lead to; not a very subtle threat to European powers.

This was
followed by him highlighting his support for “national” armies in Syria
and Libya in their fight against radical groups.

Thus, a victory
of Assad in Syria will only serve to reinforce the use of repression as a tool
for regime maintenance across the region.

Russia rising

Another
important impact is the affirmation of Russia’s rising role in the region, and
most importantly as a reliable ally to regional autocrats in their time of
need. Unlike the US and EU, which have shown themselves as unreliable allies in
the case of deep revolutionary crisis, Russia has shown no hesitation to
actively intervene in support.

In Egypt for
example, one of the US’ strongest allies in the region, Mubarak was abandoned
once it appeared that the crisis would not subside with moderate levels of
repression. Now, this would make an alliance with Russia very attractive for
embattled regimes who fear imminent mass uprisings against their rule.

This, combined
with the presidency of Trump and his willingness to cooperate with Russia, can
potentially usher in increased Russian influence in the region. The recent
nomination of Rex Tillerson, the CEO of Exxon who has close connections to Russia, is a strong indication of this
trend.

The repressive
behavior of Arab autocrats will be reinforced, as they now know they have a
proven and reliable ally they can call upon when in need.

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Another
important shift is in the position of Saudi Arabia, one of the strongest
opponents of the Assad regime that has continuously insisted on his departure
from power.

In its conflict
with Iran, the Kingdom has been steadily losing ground, and this is abundantly
clear in the case of Syria where Iran, as one of the primary backers of the
Syrian regime, has been on the winning side.

The current
trend of the Syrian civil war, the souring of relations between the Kingdom and
Egypt as well as Saudi entanglement in the war in Yemen, all spell a series of
blows to the strategic objective of containing Iran and limiting its regional
role.

In essence, the
fall of Aleppo will only serve to cement Iranian hegemony in Syria as well as strengthen
its position in Lebanon through its ally Hezbollah. The increased clout of
Hezbollah has manifested itself in the election of Michelle Aoun, one of their close allies, as the President of Lebanon.

As such, Saudi
attempts to contain Iranian penetration of the Levant have failed, weakening their
position as a regional power and restricting it more to its core region of
influence, namely the Gulf.

This, combined
with a souring of relations with Egypt, partly driven
by Egyptian misgivings over Saudi positions over Syria and Yemen, has
considerably weakened the position of the Kingdom, as it could have potentially
relied on Egypt and its military as a counter balance to Iran. 

Turkey

Turkey seems to
have made losing foreign policy bets over the past five years. From the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt to the armed opposition in Syria’s north, Turkey has lost
on many fronts.

In terms of the
dynamic in Syria, Turkey seems to have tacitly accepted the fall of Aleppo and
the defeat of the rebels as it shifts its focus towards the Kurds, creating a
border buffer against IS, its relations with the EU, and consolidation of
Erdogan’s power base after the attempted coup.

It also appears
that the warming of Turkish-Russian relations
combined with its lack of response regarding the current onslaught in Aleppo,
has shown a tacit acceptance of Russian hegemony over Syria and the outcome of
the conflict.

As such, the
nature of the Syrian civil war, partly a proxy war, has significant impact on the
region. The outcome of the struggle over Aleppo will shape the future of the
region for years to come.