The troubling political economy of Iraq’s Sh’ia clerical establishment

When the US invaded Iraq in
2003 it subsequently disbanded the country’s army, dismantled its security
infrastructure and instituted an extensive set of occupation policies, all apparently geared at making it the main political, security and economic actor in the
country. The consequences of those early policies and actions have radically
transformed Iraq over the past few years, effectively turning it into a theatre for
the playing out of domestic and regional contestations. One such emerging struggle over the future of Iraq, particularly for the devout Shi’a
both inside and without the country, has been tracked by what has since happened to Iraq’s
revered shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf.

Seeing itself as the new permanent power in Iraq – effectively a new state order – the US
actively engaged in state wrecking rather than institution building. The
occupation viewed Iraq as conquered territory and at this early
stage. in 2003 and 2004, US hegemonic power over the country seemed impregnable. Iraq’s state institutions were in tatters and as a result, new and often
multiple conflicts unfolded across the country.

Notwithstanding organised
violence against the occupation, which sought to upend US plans of making Iraq
a client state, another set of foreign-devised policies were also being enacted. Specifically, shrine cities were now facing the
onslaught of Iranian plans to
undermine Iraq’s Shi’a clergy (ulama), particularly Najaf’s clerical
establishment (marja'iyah), which constitutes a potential source of
competition to Iran’s own Shi’a religious and political authorities.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the forced collapse of its state
institutions had provided a rare opportunity for the Iranian government, which
now sought to win what has long been a historical struggle for the control of Najaf and
Karbala, the main sites of Shi’a learning in the world. According to renowned
scholar Yitzak
Nakash, the historical contestation in Iraq between Shi’a Arabs and Shi’a
Iranians, or Persians, was fought over the control of Karbala and Najaf. The
author, reviewing the past two hundred years, states that “in Karbala and Najaf, the Persian religious
families managed to overshadow the Arab ulama and succeeded in dominating
religious circles….by the mid-nineteenth century, the Persian ulama in Iraq had
already controlled most of the Shi’a charitable funds and the madrasas…”

Beneath the veneer of a
hegemonic America in an occupation that largely focused on its own security
situation, was this enactment of an Iranian plan to control Shi’a Islam’s holiest
sites. The Iraq war and the changed politics brought about by the occupation,
particularly in the wake of the vacuum the US had created in the country, allowed this battle for control of Iraq’s religious
sites to play itself out.

Historically, the clerical
class in Iraq have relied on two sources of finance; namely, money from
religious tourism and pilgrimage as well as from the transportation, care and
burial of the Shi’a dead, particularly in Najaf’s Wadi al Salam, the world’s
biggest cemetery. According to Nakash, the “flow of foreign money to the shrine cities had major consequences on
their political orientation and socioeconomic organisation. The shrine cities
developed an economy based on charities and payments for religious services,
and on the income from the pilgrimage and the carriage of the dead.”

Whilst the political
economy of Najaf and Karbala had been much affected by previous historical turning points, such as the establishment of the Iraqi state in the
1920s, then the impact of Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as international
sanctions in the 1990s, the post-2003 developments once again altered the order of
things.

under and after the US occupation of Iraq the Iranian government resorted to controlling, albeit indirectly, Najaf and Karbala, which was the most secure way to realise its objectives

Specifically, a calculated set of Iranian interventions that had not been
witnessed for over a century was now implemented in Iraq. Such
interventions were designed for the long-term dominance of Karbala and Najaf,
and were largely economic in nature rather than overtly political or religious.
Sources of funding, divided between different and often competing Iraqi Shi’a
clerical schools, have historically ensured that Iraq’s marja'iyah enjoyed
a degree of autonomy from the whims of politicians who sought to influence the
devout Shi’a in ways conducive to their own interests. For Iran, such autonomy
from itself and its policies could not be tolerated, but also could not be
attacked head-on. As a result, under and after the US occupation of Iraq the
Iranian government resorted to controlling, albeit indirectly, Najaf and
Karbala, the most secure way to realise its objectives.

Iran’s political system is
based on Khomeini’s Wilayat al Faqih, an arrangement that champions
an Iranian-based religious authority and figure of emulation in Shi’a Islam.
After 2003, the Iranian government, cognizant of the new freedoms that Iraq’s
clergy could exercise, moved to ensure that it did not undermine
Iran’s own religious authority in Qum – its centre of religious legitimacy – on
which the post-1979 state ideology is premised. For the Iranian government, its
priority was to ensure that it was the source of Shi’a legitimacy, and not
Najaf, whose leading clerics have promoted the separation of religion from the
state.

The empowerment of an
autonomous Shi’a clerical establishment in Karbala and Najaf after 2003 would
soon be undermined by Ithe carrying out of a concerted set of Iranian policies to control its economies. As a result, the economies
of Karbala and Najaf have since been tightly controlled by Iranian state and
private companies. Iran’s state-owned tourist companies have invested heavily
in controlling and managing the religious pilgrimage to Karbala and Najaf,
particularly as a way of ensuring that Iranian pilgrims spend as little of their
resources as possible in Iraq. Iran’s private sector investors have also been
encouraged to invest in such things as hotels and consequently have become key
actors in the hospitality industry in these cities.

The provision of
substantially reduced prices for accommodation and food, as well as transport
to Iraq, especially for Iranian pilgrims, have all been heavily regulated in
ways to reduce a leakage of Iranian foreign currency that the government fears
could end up strengthening Iraq’s marja'iyah, which could in
turn tap into historically significant streams derived from pilgrim’s money.
Iran’s consulates in each of the shrine cities, play a key role in enforcing
these structures. More recently, in November 2015, over half a million Iranian
pilgrims crossed Iraq without paying the $30 visa fee. In addition, Karbala’s
and Najaf’s agrarian economies and light industries have also been decimated by
subsidised goods coming from Iran. Such policies amount to a concerted policy
to undermine the independent growth of anything outside the direct controlling
influence of Iran.

From 2003, Iraqi Shi’a-based political parties, such as the Islamic Supreme Council and the Sadrist
Movement, were now not only competing to capture as much of the remaining state
institutions and resources that the US had neglected to care for, but were also
clashing with each other to capture the shrine cities for themselves. Their
participation in national and provincial elections legitimised their
actions, tying politics and religion ever closer together. Their efforts saw
them develop religious, political and security wings, not unlike a state
authority. Each political party championed its own version of Shi’a authority,
based on familial lineages stemming from deceased and respected figures of Shi’a
emulation, or Mar’ajah. Captured
state funding from key Iraqi ministries that such parties were able to control
was recycled back to Najaf and Karbala with a view to strengthening the
political, religious and economic bases they had worked to build, but also
importantly as a way to compete with Iranian goals over Iraq’s shrine cities.

As a result, the blurring
of lines between religion and politics became very clear, troubling and creating discord in the marja'iyah in Najaf. In this emerging environment, Grand
Ayatollah Syed al Sistani, the figure of authority in Iraq and the Shi'a world,
was compelled to distance himself over recent years from both domestic
political parties as well as Iranian action. As the highest source of
legitimacy for the majority of devout Shi’a, al Sistani has often found himself
carefully negotiating the actions of Iraq’s political parties and Iran itself
who both vie for the seat of religious power.

At the age of 85, al
Sistani will soon be succeeded by those currently competing for Najaf’s
influence. Whoever becomes the next figure to take over his authority however,
whether Iraqi Arab Shi’a or Iranian Shi’a, will have to deal with an economic
environment heavily influenced by the outcomes of long-term and carefully
calculated Iranian government interventions.