What Europe can get from Iran

Iranians pour onto streets ( t-shirt shows Minister of Foreign Affairs), July 14, 2015. Demotix/Meysam Mim. All rights reserved.Europeans hope
that diplomatic success on the nuclear issue will have a spin-off effect,
allowing broader engagement with Iran. For the past decade,
Europe has adopted a containment policy on Iran, which has been pursued through
a mixture of sanctions, threats of military strikes by the US and Israel, and a
diplomatic freeze with Iran on regional conflicts. This has given Europe
leverage in the nuclear negotiations, while allowing it to reduce Israeli fears
and prevent the risk of a long and costly military confrontation with Iran.

But
the deliberate exclusion of Iran has been counterproductive to Europe’s
strategic objectives. Iran’s striking absence from the Geneva
conferences on Syria has shrunk Europe’s options for constructive progress and
de-escalation in Syria. In some instances, the containment policy exacerbated
Tehran’s fears and paranoia about a western plot for regime change and, as a
result, caused the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to intensify its anti-western regional action. Moreover,
given the lack of alternatives, Europe has been forced to side consistently
with its traditional regional allies, even when their proposals proved less
effective than Iran’s or further fractured the region.

It has been difficult
for political actors in Europe to think outside the “containment box” about a
possible role for Iran on non-nuclear issues – and, in any case, it would have
been futile to do so, given the nuclear-centric orientation of Europe’s
relations with Iran. In formulating expectations on regional security, Europe
will need to consider Tehran’s priorities as well as the current geopolitical
realities. Iran’s regional priority is to create sufficient stability to
prevent direct attacks at its borders from extremist groups that would threaten
the Iranian state system and the country’s majority Shia population, while at
the same time working to strengthen its influence abroad. Tehran is first and
foremost concerned with its neighbours, Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking at a
minimum that leaders in those countries are unthreatening to Iran and to some
degree dependent on Tehran’s support. On its border with Pakistan, Iran is
actively tackling hostile Sunni extremists and working to prevent the
“Talibanisation of Pakistan”. Iran wants to preserve the Axis of Resistance
against what it believes to be a US and Israeli plan for regime change in
Tehran. Maintaining access routes to Hezbollah, and consequently a loyal
security apparatus in Syria and Lebanon, is critical to this strategy.

As part of implementing
these priorities and expanding its influence in areas with power vacuums, Iran
has become entangled in a zero-sum battle with other regional powers. After the
succession in January 2015 of its new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi
Arabia has taken a much more assertive position in uniting a “Sunni front”,
including Turkey, to overturn what it perceives to be Iran’s hegemonic goals,
particularly in Syria. This has placed Tehran and the House of Saud in a more
violent state of proxy war than ever before. It is likely to be years before
any significant rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia takes place; in
fact, the two countries’ relations are likely to deteriorate in the short term
after the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). Even the ISIS surge, and
the existential threat that it represents to the region, has not raised the
threshold enough for either Iran or Saudi Arabia to abandon the current
approach in order to fight a common threat. It is likely that anything Iran
could realistically offer would be dismissed as too little by Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa. Given Iran’s relative position of strength after the endorsement of
the JCPOA, Europe would like to see Tehran making a more meaningful outreach to
Riyadh – if not directly, then either through impartial European member states
or through Oman.

The proxy war between
Iran and Saudi Arabia has had a toxic effect on the situation in Syria. The
future of Assad, a longstanding ally of Tehran, will be the most challenging
and slow-moving frontier for diplomacy with Iran. Tehran’s support for Assad
has extended Damascus a lifeline that has enabled it to continue fighting
moderate and extremist opposition groups, which has had grave humanitarian
costs for the Syrian people and caused destruction in the country. Even though
Iran plays a critical role in Syria, it has neither been invited to nor
participated in United Nations-brokered political tracks where these have been
preconditioned on endorsing Assad’s departure. For member states that have
backed Syrian opposition groups, it will be extremely difficult to forgo the
precondition of Assad’s removal in order to accept Iran’s inclusion in such
talks.

So far, Europeans have
not sufficiently tested the possibility that Iran might be able to cause the
Assad regime to change its behaviour in advance of a comprehensive political
settlement. After a nuclear deal, this should be investigated, albeit with the
understanding that progress might require trade-offs and is likely to be incremental
at best. One method would be to ascertain whether and how far Iran can provide
the UN with humanitarian access into Syria by instructing Hezbollah forces and IRGC personnel on the ground to allow deliveries
through. Europeans would like to see Tehran exerting pressure on Damascus to
halt the use of barrel bombings and other egregious methods being used by the
regime in civilian-populated areas. As part of exploratory dialogue on the
broader political arrangement in Syria, Iran could perhaps be persuaded to
narrow its goals to focus on maintaining strategic access routes into Lebanon
and protecting Shia shrines and Alawite areas as a way of reducing sectarian
tensions with Sunnis.

Including Iran in a
serious diplomatic initiative on Syria could increase the prospects for a
durable solution. However, two factors complicate any such effort. The first
relates to whether Tehran is willing to cooperate on piecemeal efforts without
agreement on an overarching political settlement. It is true that Iran is
likely to postpone the grand Assad question until it can be assured that any
group hostile to Iran, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Jaish al-Fateh,
would not be able to take hold of Damascus or the critical resupply routes to
Hezbollah. But four-plus years into the fighting, Europeans remain divided as
to the endgame in Syria and are unable to make assurances on behalf of
extremist opposition groups. Secondly, in spite of Iran’s leverage and ability
to halt critical aid to Syria, its sway over the elite decision-making circle
of the Syrian regime is far from absolute – especially at a time when the
leadership in Damascus is focused on survival. Nevertheless, some consider that
a political track would be worth revisiting in light of recent blows to the
Syrian regime. There are also indications that, in order to prevent the
dissolution of Syria’s Tehran-friendly security apparatus, Iran would be
willing to accept the eventual replacement of Assad with a figure that is not
hostile to Tehran.

The military campaign
against ISIS in Iraq has triggered a more pragmatic Iranian approach towards
the west, somewhat similar to their tactical cooperation in defeating al-Qaeda
and the Taliban after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Some European member
states have joined the US-led anti-ISIS air coalition, while others have
provided training and arms to Iraq’s central army and to Kurdish Peshmerga
forces. In private, western officials say that Iran has been the most willing
and effective force in coordinating ground troops with the coalition’s air
campaign against ISIS. Europeans would have preferred a strong Iraqi security
force that could act independently of Iran, but they recognise that no Iraqi or
foreign actor has the appetite or ability to replace Iran.

However, the west faces
a real dilemma in cooperating with Iran on a counter-ISIS strategy. Iran’s role
in mobilising Iraqi Shia militias has been integral to recapturing ISIS-held
territories and preventing further ISIS gains. But the excesses of Shia militia
have also fuelled the Sunni buy-in to ISIS. Tehran agreed to the removal of
Iraq’s divisive prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, which was a positive step in
addressing the legitimate grievances of Sunni communities. But the change in
the administration has not brought about shifts in state policy sufficient to
reduce sectarian strife. The abuses carried out by Shia militia groups after
entering ISIS-held territories have been a major factor in causing some Sunni
tribal leaders to declare allegiance to ISIS. Another matter for concern is the
possibility that the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), commanded by IRGC
advisers, could one day become a resistance force to government control, like
Hezbollah in Lebanon. This would increase Iran’s capacity to benefit from
future security gaps in Iraq at Baghdad’s expense.

Europe can tolerate
and, to a degree, welcome Iran’s operations against ISIS, as long as they do
not weaken Iraq’s central government or ignite sectarian divisions. In theory, the
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) receive their mandate and payroll from Baghdad – but, in practice, the
IRGC orchestrates their movements. To address Iraqi and western concerns, Iran
is likely to continue to support the integration of Iraq’s Shia militias into
the PMUs, which now include Sunni forces. If the majority of Shia militias can
be fully integrated into the PMUs and kept loyal to the state structure, their
ability to challenge the central security forces would be reduced. In addition,
Europe will want to see Iran taking a more active part in tackling the actual
and perceived sectarian tensions associated with its role in Iraq. One way that
might be acceptable to Iran would be for its high-ranking political, military,
and religious figures to follow the example set by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani in condemning sectarian acts and working with Baghdad to shape
inclusive political representation for Sunnis and other minorities.

Hezbollah, under the
IRGC’s guidance, has stepped up its military involvement in Iraq and Syria, and
in doing so it has proven loyal to implementing Iranian regional policies.
Although the group has suffered fatalities and is stretched in Syria, it sees
both fights as crucial to its preservation and self-interest in preventing the
spill-over of ISIS- or al-Qaeda- allied groups into Lebanon. Europeans are
concerned about Hezbollah’s expanded regional involvement and particularly
about the threat it poses to Israeli security. In the early 2000s, Europe
initiated a candid discussion with Iran on reducing its backing for Hezbollah’s
military wing; at that time, Iran reportedly made a secret offer to the White
House to halt its support for Hezbollah. But Iran will not now enter
discussions with Europe on downgrading its relationship with Hezbollah, at a
time when the two have become interdependent in managing parallel regional
conflicts.

Nevertheless, Tehran is
likely to try to avoid provoking new military confrontation in the region; to
achieve this, it could be willing to control Hezbollah’s tit-for-tat exchanges
with Israel, particularly in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights, as long as
someone asserts reciprocal control over the Israeli side. As a precondition to
continued engagement with Europe, Iran will have to prevent Hezbollah attacks
from being carried out inside Europe. On the political track, Iran and Europe
have a shared interest in solidifying the Lebanese state through supporting
Hezbollah’s political wing in becoming more deeply integrated into official
structures, thus increasing its accountability. Iran is likely to continue
assisting Hezbollah in consolidating its power base within Lebanon’s political
structure and in maintaining order by working with the Saudi-backed March 14
alliance. The Europeans have broadly supported both sides.

Any shift in
Hezbollah’s hostility towards Israel will have to await a broader change in
Israeli-Iranian relations and a shift in Israeli policy – but this is unlikely
to happen for some time. For now, the Iranian administration is likely to
continue distancing itself from former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
outlandish Holocaust denial, which contributed to the breakdown of Iran’s
relations with Europe. Iran may also endorse future positive developments on
Palestinian reconciliation or an Arab League peace initiative. Ironically, if
escalation between Hezbollah and Israel seems likely, then Iran could be
encouraged by the West to play the external guarantor role for Hezbollah –
effectively substituting for Damascus, which took a similar position in ending
1996’s Operation Grapes of Wrath.

Yemen is the site of
the latest proxy conflict in the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and
tensions have considerably worsened since March 2015 as a result of the
Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. Many saw this mission as a kneejerk reaction to
the seizure of Sana’a by the Houthi opposition in alliance with ex-president
Ali Abdullah Saleh, because the group has been deepening its links with Iran.
Some European member states have voiced concerns about the prospects for and
humanitarian costs of this airstrike campaign, but others have either turned a
blind eye to or been complicit in Saudi behaviour. The warring sides in Yemen
are now further away from returning to a political track – and meanwhile,
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, one of the al-Qaeda affiliates that has
proved most harmful to western interests, is gaining territory and
consolidating its power base in Yemen.

Unlike in Syria or
Iraq, Iran has few interests at stake in Yemen and may therefore be willing to aid western efforts at conflict resolution, which could set a useful precedent. The
Houthis are far from being Iran’s proxies, although its leaders have good
relations with Tehran and have sought, but not necessarily followed, the IRGC’s
guidance. Iran could play a constructive role in pressing the Houthis to
agree to a permanent ceasefire, and to accept a middle-way political outcome if
the west can encourage Saudi Arabia to do the same. In the longer term, Iran
could encourage the Houthis to integrate into a political track aimed at
instituting power-sharing in Yemen. There has already been some convergence
between Europe and Iran on coordinating humanitarian aid in Yemen so as to
prevent further tension with Saudi Arabia. 

Thanks go to the author and to the European Council on Foreign Relations
for permission to publish this excerpt. For the full ECFR briefing, Engaging with Iran: a European Agenda and its recommendations, see here.